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Economic Dances for Two (and Three)
Propositions
1. If there is a costless return policy, then the lowest price likely signals
the best deal (chapter 1).
2. The presence of fully uninformed consumers redistributes welfare to-
wards firms, but does not in itself jeopardize efficiency. It is the partially
informed consumers whose presence creates inefficient markets (chapter 1).
3. An ability to target competitors stabilizes competition (chapter 2).
4. The organizational choices of competing firms depend upon each other
through market interactions (chapter 3).
5. Research that may lead to a major but unlikely innovation will be con-
ducted by each competitor in private. Research that may lead to a small but
likely innovation will be conducted jointly by all competitors (chapter 4).
6. The phenomenon of competition is only second best, because compe-
tition encourages both Pareto-improvements and rent-seeking.
7. One shall not strive to decrease all transaction costs. If there are no
transaction costs, there are no mechanisms for commitment.
8. Solving a game-theoretical model with continuous time and no end
can be easier than solving an analogous model with three periods. However,
this counterintuitive observation would not be true if studying theoretical
questions using numerical techniques was more broadly accepted.
9. To play well one needs clever opponents, unless of course it is a zero
sum two person game.
10. A richer person has more wealth to invest. In deciding where to
invest, he effectively chooses in what direction the economy will develop.
Thus, wealth is a right to choose the path for an economy.
11. There is little applied game theory in doing a PhD unless one does a
PhD in applied game theory.
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